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Abstract 
The present study investigated how task-irrelevant attributes of a stimulus affected responses in a 
multi-attribute version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In Experiment 1, participants 
categorized images of Black and White male and female individuals on the basis of either race or 
gender. Both the race and gender of the individuals affected task performance regardless of 
which attribute was currently relevant to performing the task, yielding the IAT effects on both 
attributes.  However, the influences of a task-irrelevant attribute depended on whether the task-
relevant attribute was categorized compatibly or incompatibly with the underlying implicit 
biases. These results suggest that individuals are still categorized implicitly based on task-
irrelevant social attributes and that the explicit categorization required in the standard IAT has a 
considerable impact on implicit social biases. Experiment 2 considered a third, non-social 
attribute (the color of the picture frame) and reproduced task-irrelevant IAT effects and their 
dependence on explicit categorization.  However, Experiments 3 and 4 suggested that the task-
irrelevant IAT effects based on social attributes are determined by whether the task-relevant 
attribute is a social or non-social attribute. The results raise fundamental questions about the 
basic assumptions underpinning the interpretations of the results from the IAT.   
  
Keywords: Implicit association test; implicit attitude; bias modification; automatic processes.  
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It is widely accepted in psychology that attitudes shape perceptions and actions in many 
different social contexts (Allport, 1935; Beattie, 2010; Sarnoff, 1960; Thorndike, 1920; 
Thurstone, 1928).  In everyday social life, people have a tendency to evaluate others based on 
personal and social attributes that are not relevant to the matters under consideration.  For 
example, attributes of a person, like their race, gender, or socioeconomic status, can influence 
other people’s judgments of them on a number of dimensions, including their perceived 
suitability for an advertised post (Beattie, Cohen, & McGuire, 2013), their perceived guilt or the 
seriousness of their crime in a courtroom setting (Downs & Lyons, 1991; Porter, ten Brinke, & 
Gustaw, 1991), or even the perceived hostility of their facial expressions or actions (Devine, 
1989).  However, the social attitudes that give rise to these judgments are not always explicit to 
those who are actually making the judgments, and the influence of these social attitudes can go 
largely unnoticed (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). These have been termed ‘implicit’ attitudes and 
have been the subject of considerable research in many different areas of psychology over years 
(Beattie, 2013).  A range of techniques have been developed to measure such implicit attitudes 
(Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; De Houwer & Eelen, 1998; De Houwer, 2003; De Houwer, Teige-
Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van 
Knippenberg, 2001; Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011; Olson & Fazio, 
2003), of which the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) has 
been the most popular and most influential method in the last two decades.   
Although the IAT has been a very popular method to test ‘implicit’ biases toward specific 
attributes of individuals, the task is designed to force participants to categorize individuals based 
on the very attributes that are tested.  The purpose of the present study was to examine whether 
the IAT effect can occur based on attributes that are completely irrelevant to the task in hand.  To 
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this end, we used versions of the IAT that involved one or more task-irrelevant attributes, which 
we call a multi-attributes IAT, or m-IAT.  In what follows, we first describe the design of the IAT 
and introduce the relevant terms that we adopted in the present study.  Next, we point out how 
the IAT forces explicit categorization of individuals against the attribute in question and raises 
the fundamental issue of the implicitness of biases that it is meant to measures.  We then 
consider why explicit categorization may have an impact on the expression of implicit biases in 
the m-IAT.  Four experiments addressed the questions of whether social biases are still observed 
when the attribute (e.g. race or gender) is irrelevant to the task and of how one’s intention to 
categorize an attribute might affect the influences of other biases.  Finally, the theoretical 
implications, and the societal significance, of the present set of findings are discussed. 
Implicit Association Test 
The IAT assesses underlying associations between attributes of stimuli (e.g., the names of 
typical White and Black individuals) and evaluative qualities (e.g., ‘pleasant’ vs. ‘unpleasant’) 
by testing how quickly people can sort the stimuli into specific categories that are associated 
with an evaluative quality or a stereotype.  It measures response time (RT) of categorization (and 
sometimes error rate) and typically shows a bias with certain types of categorization rules (e.g., 
‘White names’ to ‘good’) being quicker than others (e.g., ‘Black names’ to ‘good’).  Many 
authors have concluded that this demonstrates an implicit bias with potentially highly significant 
societal consequences (e.g., Beattie, 2013).  Although the IAT has been a popular tool in many 
domains of implicit bias and attitudes, several issues have been raised that question its validity 
for measuring possible social biases (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Blanton, Jaccard, Strauts, 
Mitchell, & Tetlock, 2015; Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006; Fiedler, Messner, & 
Bluemke, 2006; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Nosek & Sriram, 2007).   
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In the standard procedure, the IAT consists of two types of categorization tasks, which 
are often called ‘attribute’ and ‘target’ tasks in the IAT literature but we call the inducer task and 
the diagnostic task (the terminology adopted from previous studies of compatibility effects; e.g., 
Notebaert, Gevers, Verguts, & Fias, 2006) to express their functional roles in the procedure more 
accurately (see also De Houwer, 2003, for a similar distinction between two mixed tasks).  The 
inducer task induces evaluative qualities (e.g. ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’) in non-evaluative responses (left 
and right key presses), and the diagnostic task is used to identify biases against specific 
categories (e.g., Black and White individuals when paired with the evaluative concepts).  The 
performance of categorization in the diagnostic task is the primary basis of the measure of 
implicit attitudes.  In the original design (Greenwald et al., 1998), the inducer task required 
categorizing a set of words into ‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant’ based on their meanings by pressing 
one of two response keys.  The diagnostic task required categorizing another set of words into 
one of two categories, depending upon the specific attribute of interest.  For instance, to measure 
attitudes toward flowers and insects, participants were asked to categorize the names of flowers 
and insects into the categories ‘flower’ or ‘insect’; and to measure attitudes toward race, 
participants were asked to categorize people’s names into typical ‘Black’ or ‘White’ names.   
Importantly, participants categorized the stimuli in the diagnostic task by pressing the 
same response keys as those that were used to indicate whether words were ‘pleasant’ or 
‘unpleasant’ in the inducer task.  In one condition, one category (e.g. ‘flowers’) shared a 
response key with pleasant words, and the other category (‘insects’) shared the other response 
key with unpleasant words.  In the other condition, the assignment of categories to response keys 
was reversed, such that flowers now shared a response key with unpleasant words and insects 
with pleasant words.  The results showed that responses were faster with the former pairing of 
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the inducer categories and the diagnostic categories than with the latter pairing. This advantage 
of the former pairing was interpreted as reflecting the consistency of category assignment with 
implicit attitudes of the participants toward flowers and insects.  That is, the flower-
pleasant/insect-unpleasant assignment was compatible with implicit attitudes that participants 
hold toward flowers and insects, whereas the flower-unpleasant/insect-pleasant assignment was 
incompatible with them.  
How implicit are implicit attitudes? 
The IAT effect is usually attributed to two types of cognitive processes that compete for a 
response, namely automatic and controlled processes (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2009; Devine, 
1989; Greenwald et al., 1998; Sherman et al., 2008).  As is assumed for more widely known 
interference effects in cognitive psychology, such as Stroop interference (MacLeod, 1991) and 
the Simon effect (Lu & Proctor, 1995; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 2012), automatic processes are 
initiated with little attentional resources or intention regardless of the task context.  Controlled 
processes are those that require attentional resources and depend on the intention to carry out a 
specific task.  In the IAT, the controlled process is thought to operate based on the assignment of 
stimuli to response keys (e.g., ‘flowers’ to the left key and ‘insects’ to the right key), whereas the 
automatic process activates a response based on implicit associations between the stimuli and the 
concepts attached to the response keys (e.g., ‘flowers are good’ and ‘insects are bad’).  With the 
assignment of categories that is compatible with implicit associations, both controlled and 
automatic processes activate the correct response; with the assignment that is incompatible with 
implicit associations, the controlled process activates the correct response while the automatic 
process activates an incorrect response.  As the automatic process reacts quickly, the tendency to 
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follow the automatic reaction has to be overcome if one is to make the correct response (Conray, 
Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005).  
Although it is a very popular and common notion within psychology, the term 
‘automaticity’ does require careful elaboration.  Traditionally, automatic processes are those that 
do not require attention, awareness, or intention (e.g., Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; 
MacLeod, 1991; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), but no phenomenon has 
been found to satisfy all of these qualities of automaticity simultaneously (Bargh, 1989; 
Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Logan, 1988; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; Moors & De Houwer, 
2006).  In the context of the IAT and related studies, the implicitness of ‘implicit attitude’ has 
been questioned by many researchers (De Houwer et al., 2009; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Fiedler, 
Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014; Livingston & Brewer, 2002; 
Olson & Fazio, 2003).  As a representative example, Fazio and Olson (2003) have shown that 
requiring categorization of faces in terms of race prior to the IAT inflates the IAT score, 
presumably due to increased attention to racial attributes of individuals.  They argued that what 
is implicit in the IAT is not the attitude that the IAT aims to measure, but it is the fact that 
individuals’ attitudes are being assessed; that is, participants who perform the IAT may be 
unaware that their attitudes are measured in the task, although they may be well aware of their 
attitudes toward the attributes used in the test (Berger, 2018; Hahn et al., 2014).  Also, when the 
task-context is related to a specific attribute, the motivation to control a negative attitude toward 
that attribute is evoked, which overcompensates the negative bias (Wegener & Petty, 1995).  The 
requirement to explicitly categorize materials based on a specific attribute may indeed evoke 
their attitudes toward that attribute in the IAT (Fazio, 1989; Klauer, 1997).   
Influences of Explicit Categorization in the IAT 
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It is even possible that the IAT score depends entirely on the requirement to attend 
explicitly to a specific attribute of materials.  Consistent with this possibility, no IAT effect was 
obtained based on the pleasantness of materials when the task required explicit categorization of 
the names of historical figures into British or non-British (De Houwer, 2001).  Similarly, when 
the same set of materials were categorized based on two different attributes (‘Black’ vs. ‘White’, 
or ‘athlete’ vs. ‘politician’), the IAT effect depended on the attribute that the task required to 
categorize the materials (Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  The IAT effect could even be 
‘reversed’ if a positive category (e.g., ‘flower’) consisted of negative exemplars (‘poison ivy’) 
and a negative category (‘insect’) consisted of positive exemplars (‘butterfly’; Govan & 
Williams, 2004). Similar results were obtained for the attribute materials (i.e., when positive 
inducer words are related to a negative category; Bluemke & Friese, 2006; Steffens & Plewe, 
2001).  Hence, the IAT effect depends on how the target and attribute categories are 
conceptualized, rather than the attitude toward the categories being implicit or automatic. 
Therefore, there appear to be abundant evidence that the explicit categorization required in the 
IAT can have a considerable impact on the IAT scores.   
These findings suggest an important possibility that could undermine the validity of the 
IAT as a measure of implicit attitude to be manifested in everyday decision making.  If the IAT 
scores depend on explicit categorization that is required by the task itself, then the IAT score 
may not be a valid representation of one’s implicit attitude that is expressed in a situation where 
the attribute associated with the implicit attitude is irrelevant to making a judgment.  For 
example, people who obtain a high score in the racial IAT may express a racial bias only in a 
condition where they are required to judge individuals based on race, but they may not suffer 
from the racial bias in a situation where they are required to judge the same individuals based on 
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another quality (e.g., selecting job candidates based on academic qualifications).  The present 
study addresses this issue experimentally and asks whether the IAT effect can occur based on 
attributes of the stimuli that are irrelevant to the task at hand.   
The Present Study 
The aims of the present study were twofold; (1) whether the IAT effect is obtained based 
on a task-irrelevant attribute of the materials, and (2) how the explicit requirement to categorize 
the materials based on one attribute influences the IAT effect based on a task-irrelevant attribute.  
To this end, the present study used a multi-attributes version of the IAT task, or m-IAT (also see 
De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003).  As in the original version of the IAT, the m-IAT 
requires participants to perform two tasks, the inducer task and the diagnostic task.  The inducer 
task associates non-evaluative responses (left and right key presses) with evaluative qualities 
(‘pleasant’ vs. ‘unpleasant’); participants have to categorize a set of words into ‘pleasant’ or 
‘unpleasant’ categories according to their meanings by pressing two alternative keys.  The 
diagnostic task tests the pre-existing associations between social or non-social attributes of 
stimuli and the evaluative qualities of the responses; participants categorize images of 
individuals’ faces according to an attribute by pressing the response keys that are also used in the 
inducer task.  More specifically, in the present study, participants categorized photographs of 
individuals based on their gender or race, and we examined whether the IAT effect emerged on 
another attribute that was irrelevant to the categorization.  This version of the IAT provided a 
means to address not only the issue of whether explicit categorization of an attribute is necessary 
to obtain the IAT effect on that attribute, but also the issue of how explicit categorization of one 
attribute influences the IAT effect on other attributes. 
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Previous studies that used the IAT task involving multiple attributes found that the IAT 
effect emerged only on an attribute that was relevant to the task (De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell et 
al., 2003).  These are indeed curious results, given that there are many variations of cognitive 
tasks that yield effects of task-irrelevant attributes of stimuli on performance (e.g., Kohnblum et 
al., 1990; MacLeod, 1991; Lu & Proctor, 1995), including those that are concerned with implicit 
attitudes, such as the affective misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & 
Stewart, 2005), the affective priming task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the 
Go/No-Go association test (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the extrinsic affective Simon task (De 
Houwer, 2003), the pronunciation task (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996), and others 
(see Nosek et al., 2011).  One possibility is that this is due to the unique procedure used in the 
IAT.  Unlike the IAT, most other procedures avoid explicit categorization or evaluation of the 
target attribute in the task (see Livingston & Brewer, 2002), and this requirement of explicit 
categorization might eliminate the IAT effect based on task-irrelevant attributes.  
Evidence supporting such a possibility is provided in a classic study (Hedge & Marsh, 
1975), in which an advantage of task-irrelevant stimulus-response compatibility (i.e., the Simon 
effect) was reversed by task instructions.  In that study, participants were required to respond to 
the colors of stimuli (red and green lights) by pressing keys that were colored in the same as, or 
different from, the stimuli.  When participants pressed the key of the same color as the stimulus 
(i.e., red response to red light, and green response to green light), there was a typical spatial 
compatibility effect; that is, responses were faster to spatially-compatible stimuli than to 
spatially-incompatible stimuli, even when the spatial attribute was task-irrelevant.  However, 
when participants pressed the keys in the alternate colors, the spatial compatibility effect was 
reversed to favour paring of incompatible stimulus and response locations (i.e., left key press 
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was faster for stimuli on the right than on the left).  This reversal suggests that the spatial 
compatibility effect depended on explicit color categorization that participants intended to 
perform (see also Baroni, Yamaguchi, Chen, & Proctor, 2013).  Similar influences of explicit 
categorization might have been present in previous studies of the IAT that also involved task-
irrelevant attributes, but the task-irrelevant IAT score might be averaged out when the results for 
the compatible and incompatible blocks were aggregated (Mitchell et al., 2003)1.  Therefore, we 
consider whether the explicit categorization required in the task influences the IAT effect based 
on attributes of stimuli that are irrelevant to the required categorization.  
Across four experiments reported in the present article, the attributes used in the 
diagnostic task were either social (race or gender) or non-social (color) attributes of stimuli.  
Experiment 1 aimed to provide the basic outcomes of the m-IAT with regard to the IAT effects 
based on the task-relevant and task-irrelevant social attributes.  The results of Experiment 1 
would also be suggestive of how the explicit requirement to categorize materials based on one 
attribute influences ‘implicit’ categorizations based on another attribute (e.g., how categorization 
based on race influences the IAT effect based on gender bias).  Experiment 2 further tested 
whether ‘implicit’ categorization of materials based on a task-irrelevant attribute would modulate 
‘implicit’ categorization based on another task-irrelevant attribute.  Experiments 3 and 4 
followed up the findings of these two experiments and examined the influence of explicit 
categorization of non-social attributes on ‘implicit’ categorization of social attributes. These 
experiments reveal important clues about the underlying mechanisms of the IAT. 
                                                 
1 De Houwer (2001) also examined whether the IAT effect emerged based on a task-relevant attribute or a task-
irrelevant attribute. He used two dichotomous values (British vs. non-British, and like vs. dislike) and found the 
effect based only on the task-relevant attribute, with no sign of the effect on the task-irrelevant attribute.  However, 
this study did not test a condition in which the two attributes were flipped in their roles, so it does not exclude the 
possibility that the IAT effect might not have emerged even when the task-irrelevant attribute was used as the task-
relevant attribute.  
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Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, stimuli for the inducer task were a set of words, which were categorized 
into ‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant’ based on their meaning.  Stimuli for the diagnostic task were 
images of individuals that varied in both race and gender (White females and males, and Black 
females and males).  Each participant performed two versions of the diagnostic task.  In the race 
task, the materials were categorized in terms of the racial groups (White vs. Black); in the gender 
task, the materials were categorized in terms of the gender groups (male vs. female).  Only 
participants who identified their own race as White were included in the present experiment (32 
males and 32 females).   
From previous IAT studies (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998), it was expected that responses 
should be faster when participants pressed the ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ keys, respectively, for 
individuals who belong to their own racial or gender group and for those who do not belong to 
their own racial or gender group than when they pressed the same keys with the reversed 
assignments.  That is, as all participants were identified themselves as White, they should press 
the ‘pleasant’ key for White individuals and the ‘unpleasant’ key for Black individuals faster 
than the ‘unpleasant’ key for White individuals and the ‘pleasant’ key for Black individuals; this 
is the race IAT effect.  Also, participants should press the ‘pleasant’ key to their own gender 
group and the ‘unpleasant’ key to the opposite gender group faster than the ‘unpleasant’ key to 
their own gender group and the ‘pleasant’ key to the opposite gender; this is the gender IAT 
effect.  Several studies have shown that the gender IAT effect is typically found amongst females 
but not males (Aidman & Carroll, 2003; Meissner & Rothermund, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2003; 
Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Although the reason for such findings is still open to debate, the results 
of female and male participants were considered separately in the present experiment.  
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Just as in the Simon task (Hedge & Marsh, 1975), the IAT effect may also depend on 
whether category assignments are compatible or incompatible with participants’ attitude toward 
the target attribute.  In the race IAT task, the task-irrelevant gender attribute may produce a 
standard IAT effect (i.e., faster responses when participants’ own gender group is responded to 
by pressing the ‘pleasant’ key than when it is responded to by pressing the ‘unpleasant’ key) in a 
block where the task-relevant race attribute is mapped to the pleasant/unpleasant categories 
compatibly (i.e., ‘White’ is assigned to ‘pleasant’ and ‘Black’ is assigned to ‘unpleasant’).  But 
the task-irrelevant gender attribute may produce a reversed IAT effect (i.e., faster responses 
when participants’ own gender group is responded to by pressing the ‘unpleasant’ key than when 
it is responded to by pressing the ‘pleasant’ key) in a block where the task-relevant race attribute 
is mapped to the pleasant/unpleasant categories incompatibly (‘White’ is assigned to 
‘unpleasant’ and ‘Black’ is assigned to ‘pleasant’). If a reversal of the task-irrelevant IAT effect 
occurs in the incompatible block, it could have cancelled out the effect in the compatible block 
when these blocks were aggregated together.  This might explain the lack of the IAT effect based 
on a task-irrelevant attribute in previous studies (e.g., De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003).   
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty four participants were recruited for the present experiment2.  Half of the 
participants were White males (mean age = 21.72, SD = 2.94, range = 18-30), and the other half 
were White females (mean age = 20.47, SD = 2.72, range = 18-32).  Their racial identity was 
based on self-report.  All participants were students at Edge Hill University in the Northwest of 
                                                 
2 With all variables being within-subject factors, a sample size of 24 gives a power of greater than .99 for a large 
effect size and .95 for a medium effect size, assuming a correlation of .8 among repeated measures.  To be 
conservative, we decided to recruit a larger sample size of 32 per group in the first experiment and a sample size of 
more than 24 in each of the subsequent experiments. 
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England and were either paid £3 or received experimental credits toward their psychology 
module for participation.  All participants reported having normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity and color vision.  They were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment.  The experimental 
protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology at 
Edge Hill University.  In this and subsequent experiments, we report all measures, 
manipulations, and exclusions. Sample size was determined before any data analysis. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The apparatus consisted of a personal computer and a 23-in. widescreen monitor.  The 
experiment was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Stimuli 
were photographs of 160 individuals (40 White females, 40 White males, 40 Black females, and 
40 Black males), selected from the 10K US Adult Faces Database (Bainbridge, Isola, & Oliva, 
2013).  All faces expressed happy or neutral emotions.  These images were matched on five key 
attribute ratings (see Table 1).  Images were adjusted to fit within 256 x 256 pixels and were 
displayed at the center of screen.  There were five positives words (happy, cheer, peace, love, 
and pleasure) and five negatives words (filth, evil, murder, abuse, and agony).  They were also 
presented at the center of screen, in the Courier New font at 18-pt. font size and printed in black 
against a white background.  The category labels were presented at the top left and right corners 
of the screen, indicating the assigned responses (‘z’ or ‘/’ keys).  The labels were ‘Good’ and 
‘Bad’ for the inducer task, ‘Black’ and ‘White’ for the race task, and ‘Female’ and ‘Male’ for the 
gender task.  When the inducer task was mixed with either of the latter tasks, the labels of both 
tasks were presented simultaneously; the labels for the inducer task were always presented above 
the labels of the diagnostic task.  They were also in the 18-pt. Courier New font, printed in black.  
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Responses were registered by pressing the ‘z’ and ‘/’ keys on a standard QWERTY keyboard 
with the left and right index fingers, respectively. 
Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted individually in a cubicle under normal fluorescent 
lighting.  Participants sat in front of the computer monitor at an unrestricted distance of 50 cm 
and read on-screen instructions.  There were two phases in a session.  One phase involved the 
race task in which participants categorized the race of the face stimuli into ‘White’ or ‘Black’; 
the other phase involved the gender task in which participants categorized the gender of the face 
stimuli into ‘male’ or ‘female’.  These tasks were designated as the diagnostic tasks.  Each phase 
also involved the inducer task. 
Each phase started with a practice block of eight trials on the inducer task.  Half the trials 
presented positive words, and the other half presented negative words, in a random order.  The 
locations of category labels (‘Good’ and ‘Bad’) were counterbalanced across participants.  The 
next block consisted of eight practice blocks of the diagnostic task (race or gender), with an 
equal number of images of White males, White females, Black males, and Black females.  The 
category labels were ‘Black’ and ‘White’ or ‘Male’ and ‘Female’, respectively, with the 
locations being counterbalanced across participants as well.  The third block mixed the inducer 
task and the diagnostic task in a random order.  There were 12 trials in this block, four trials for 
the inducer task and eight trials for the diagnostic task.  The fourth block was the same condition 
as the third block, consisting of 90 test trials (30 trials for the inducer task and 60 trials for the 
diagnostic task).  The fifth block was also the diagnostic task, but the locations of the category 
labels were switched; this block also consisted of eight practice trials.  The sixth block consisted 
of 12 practice trials of the inducer and diagnostic tasks with the switched category labels for the 
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diagnostic task; the category labels for the inducer task remained the same throughout the phase.  
The final block was the same as the sixth block, except that there were 90 test trials (30 trials for 
the inducer task and 60 trials for the diagnostic task).  The second phase was essentially the same 
as the first phase, except that the diagnostic task was replaced with the other task (race or 
gender).  The order of the race and gender tasks was counterbalanced across participants. 
 Each trial started with a fixation cross at the center of screen for 750 ms, followed by the 
imperative stimulus with the category labels at the top left and right corners.  The stimulus 
remained on the screen for 3000 ms or until a response was made.  If the response was incorrect, 
the error message “Error!” was presented for 500 ms; if there was no response, the message 
“Faster” was presented; and if the response was correct, a blank screen appeared for 500 ms.  RT 
was the interval between onset of the stimulus and a depression of a response key.  Response 
accuracy was also recorded on each trial. 
Results 
 The analysis focused on trials of the diagnostic tasks.  Trials for which RT was less than 
200 ms or longer than 2000 ms were discarded from the analysis (0.74% of all trials).  The 
overall error rate was 4.99%.   
For both diagnostic tasks (gender and race), mean RT for correct responses and 
percentage of error trials (PE) were computed for each participant in terms of the compatibility 
between the race category and the inducer category (Race Compatibility: compatible vs. 
incompatible) and the compatibility between the gender category and the inducer category 
(Gender Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible).  For Race Compatibility, as all participants 
were White, trials were compatible if participants pressed the key assigned to ‘Good’ for ‘White’ 
or the key assigned to ‘Bad’ for ‘Black’; trials were incompatible if they pressed the key 
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assigned to ‘Good’ for ‘Black’ or key assigned to ‘Bad’ for ‘White’.  Gender Compatibility 
depended on the gender of the participants.  Trials were compatible if participants pressed the 
key assigned to ‘Good’ for own gender or the key assigned to ‘Bad’ for the opposite gender; 
trials were incompatible if they pressed the key assigned to ‘Good’ for the opposite gender or the 
key assigned to ‘Bad’ for their own gender.  RTs were submitted to a 2 (Task: race vs. gender) x 
2 (Race Compatibility) x 2 (Gender Compatibility) ANOVA.  All factors were within-subject 
variables.  Note that several previous studies found the gender IAT effect for female participants 
but not for male participants (e.g., Meissner & Rothermund, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2003), so we 
analyzed the data separately for female and male participants.  RT and PE are summarized in 
Figure 1 and in Table 2, respectively. The results of ANOVAs are summarized in Table 3. 
Female participants.  
RT depended on Gender Compatibility and Race Compatibility, but both compatibility 
effects were modulated by Task.  For the gender task, the task-relevant gender IAT effect was 76 
ms, and the task-irrelevant race IAT effect was 7 ms.  For the race task, the task-relevant race 
IAT effect was 55 ms, and the task-irrelevant gender IAT effect was 21 ms.  Thus, the IAT 
effects were larger when the corresponding dimension was task-relevant than when it was task-
irrelevant in general.  The two types of compatibility also interacted.  Although these two factors 
did not interact with Task, interesting patterns did emerge when the interaction between the two 
types of compatibility is assessed separately for the two tasks (see Figure 1).  For the gender 
task, the interaction reflected the outcome that there was 40 ms of the task-irrelevant race IAT 
effect (p < .001) when the genders were mapped compatibly with the inducer category, but it was 
reversed to –27 ms (p = .013) when the genders were mapped incompatibly with the inducer 
category.  Similarly, for the race task, there was 51 ms of the task-irrelevant gender IAT effect (p 
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< .001) when the races were mapped compatibly with the inducer category, but it was reduced to 
–9 ms (p = .463) when the races were mapped incompatibly with the inducer category.  In short, 
the task-irrelevant IAT effect was significant for the blocks with compatible mappings but was 
reversed or eliminated for the blocks with incompatible mappings (for which participants had to 
overcome the implicit bias toward the task-relevant categories).   
 PE showed that responses were generally more accurate for the gender task (M = 4.62%) 
than for the race task (M = 7.44%).  Responses were also more accurate when gender was 
compatible with the inducer category (M = 5.29%) than when it was incompatible (M = 6.76%), 
but there was a non-significant trend that this gender IAT effect depended on the task; there was 
no effect (M = 0%) for the gender task and 2.5% for the race task.  No other effect reached 
significance. 
Male participants.  
Consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g., Aidman & Carroll, 2003; Mitchell et 
al., 2003; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), Gender Compatibility produced only a marginal effect, 
whereas Race Compatibility produced a significant effect.  However, both compatibility effects 
depended on Task (although the interaction was only marginal for Gender Compatibility).  The 
gender IAT effect was 39 ms (p = .047) for the gender task and it was –2 ms (p = .697) for the 
race task; the race IAT effect was 101 ms (p < .001) for the race task and it was 14 ms (p = .054) 
for the gender task.  No other effects were significant.  As was the case for female participants, 
the task-irrelevant IAT effect was examined separately for the compatible and incompatible 
mapping blocks.  For the gender task, the task-irrelevant race effect was 28 ms (p = .006) in the 
compatible mapping block and 0 ms (p = .991) in the incompatible mapping block.  For the race 
task, the task-irrelevant gender effect was 7 ms (p = .352) in the compatible mapping block and -
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3 ms (p = .721) in the incompatible block.  Thus, the race IAT effect still occurred even when the 
race was an irrelevant attribute, and the effect depended on whether the task-relevant gender 
attribute was mapped compatibly or incompatibly to the inducer category.  The gender IAT 
effect did not occur reliably for male participants regardless of their relevance to the task. 
 PE indicated that responses were more accurate for the gender task (M = 3.21%) than for 
the race task (M = 4.70%), and when race was compatible with the inducer category (M = 
3.29%) than when it was incompatible (M = 4.62%), yielding the race IAT effect. Although the 
gender IAT effect was not significant overall, it depended on the task; the gender IAT effect was 
1% for the gender task and it reversed to -1.40% for the race task.  There was also a larger race 
IAT effect when gender was compatible with the inducer category (M = 2.17%) than when it was 
incompatible (M = .05%).  No other effects were significant. 
Discussion 
The present experiment demonstrated typical gender and racial IAT effects based on the 
task-relevant attribute in RT.  Thus, responses were generally faster when the race or gender to 
which the participants belonged was mapped to the category ‘pleasant’ than when it was mapped 
to the category ‘unpleasant.’  The experiment also showed that IAT effects emerged on task-
irrelevant attributes.  When participants categorized images based on the gender of the relevant 
stimulus, images were categorized to ‘pleasant’ faster when the race of the individuals in the 
images was the same as participants’ own race than when it was different. Furthermore, when 
participant categorized images based on the race of the relevant stimulus, images were 
categorized to ‘pleasant’ faster when the gender of the individuals in the images was the same as 
the participants’ own gender than when it was different.  Therefore, task-irrelevant attributes of 
stimuli still influence how quickly participants categorized images, producing task-irrelevant 
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IAT effects.  Note that the effects of task-irrelevant attributes were generally smaller than those 
of task-relevant attributes.  The results are thus consistent with previous findings that the IAT 
effect depends on how stimuli are categorized (Mitchell et al., 2003), but this study extends these 
findings by showing that the IAT effect still occurs even when participants are not required to 
attend to the attribute that produced the effect.  However, it is unclear if attention is required for 
the task-irrelevant IAT effect (this is examined subsequently in Experiment 4). 
The present experiment also indicated that these task-irrelevant IAT effects depended on 
the compatibility of the explicit categorization.  In the block for which categorization was 
compatible with biases (White-pleasant/Black-unpleasant or own gender-pleasant/opposite 
gender-unpleasant), task-irrelevant IAT effects were also consistent with the biases; White and 
Black were responded faster, respectively, with pleasant and unpleasant responses than the 
reverse, whereas own gender and opposite gender were responded faster with pleasant and 
unpleasant responses than the reverse.  In another block for which categorization was 
incompatible with biases (White-unpleasant/Black-pleasant or own gender-unpleasant/opposite 
gender-pleasant), the task-irrelevant IAT effects were reversed; White and Black were now 
responded faster, respectively, with unpleasant and pleasant responses than vice versa, whereas 
own gender and opposite gender were responded faster with unpleasant and pleasant responses 
than vice versa.  Hence, task-irrelevant IAT effects depended on whether explicit categorization 
was compatible or incompatible with biases.  These outcomes are consistent with the classic 
spatial compatibility effect (Simon effect), which also depends on explicit categorization of the 
task-relevant stimulus features (Hedge & Marsh, 1975).  This finding is important because it 
raises the possibility that the IAT effect can be modified in the way that non-social bias is 
controlled (e.g., Yamaguchi, Chen, & Proctor, 2015).   
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The reason for the reversal requires further scrutiny. It has been suggested that multiple 
cognitive processes are involved in performing the IAT - detection of the task-relevant attribute, 
activation of stereotypical associations, general response bias (or guessing), and the overcoming 
of any activated stereotype (Sherman et al., 2008).  In a block with the incompatible category 
assignment (e.g., ‘Black-pleasant’/’White-unpleasant’), participants have to suppress activated 
associations to overcome an automatic response tendency.  Such efforts may modulate the 
influence of a task-irrelevant attribute as well, resulting in the observed reversal of the IAT 
effect.  It is also possible that the reversal resulted from the consistency between the task-
relevant and task-irrelevant implicit associations3.  In the compatible block, responses 
compatible with the task-irrelevant attribute are also compatible with responses required by the 
task-relevant attribute; thus, the task-relevant and task-irrelevant associations are consistent (i.e., 
both compatible).  But responses incompatible with the task-irrelevant attribute are still 
compatible with responses required by the task-relevant attribute; thus, the task-relevant and 
task-irrelevant associations are inconsistent (one is compatible but the other is incompatible).  In 
the incompatible block, responses compatible with the task-irrelevant attribute are now 
incompatible with responses required by the task-relevant attribute, so the task-relevant and task-
irrelevant associations are consistent.  But responses incompatible with the task-irrelevant 
attribute are compatible with responses required by the task-relevant attribute, so the task-
relevant and task-irrelevant associations are inconsistent.  If responses are faster when the task-
relevant and task-irrelevant associations are consistent than when they are inconsistent, this 
consistency between the task-relevant and task-irrelevant implicit associations could also explain 
the reversed IAT effect.  This possibility is considered in Experiment 2. 
                                                 
3 We thank Jan De Houwer for pointing this out. 
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Moreover, it should be noted that, with the design of the present experiment, there were 
potential confounding effects of stimulus attributes and the task-irrelevant IAT effect particularly 
for female participants4.  In the race task, the task-irrelevant (gender) IAT effect was computed 
by subtracting RT for Black males and White females from RT for Black females and White 
males in the compatible block, and by subtracting RT for Black females and White males from 
RT for Black males and White females in the incompatible block.  Similarly, in the gender task, 
the task-irrelevant (race) task was computed by subtracting RT for Black males and White 
females from White males and Black females in the compatible block, and by subtracting RT for 
Black females and White males from RT for White females and Black males in the incompatible 
block.  Consequently, the task-irrelevant IAT effect could be positive in the compatible block 
and negative in the incompatible block, just because RT for Black females and White males were 
longer in general than RT for black males and white females for unknown stimulus 
characteristics.  Note, however, this applies exclusively to the results of female participants, and 
we should have obtained a negative task-irrelevant IAT effect in the compatible block and a 
positive task-irrelevant IAT effect in the incompatible block for male participants, if such 
confounding factors were responsible for the task-irrelevant IAT effects.  The present results did 
not indicate such biases.  This issue is also considered in Experiment 2 further.   
To summarize, Experiment 1 revealed that (1) social biases do influence people’s 
judgement even when the attributes are irrelevant to the task at hand, but the effects of task-
irrelevant attributes are much smaller than those of task-relevant attributes, and that (2) the 
direction of the effect of an irrelevant social bias depends on whether the task requires 
participants to overcome the social bias against the task-relevant attribute; when participants 
                                                 
4 We thank Christoph Klauer for pointing this out. 
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categorize the individuals against their attitudes toward the individuals’ gender or race, the task-
irrelevant IAT effect is also reversed.  These outcomes suggest that participants’ intention to 
counter negative biases toward one attribute can also reverse the influences of negative biases 
toward another attribute that is present simultaneously even if they are not focal characteristics of 
the task.   
Experiment 2 
As shown in Experiment 1, the IAT effect occurs based on a task-irrelevant attribute even 
when participants were not required to use the attribute to categorize individuals.  This implies 
that participants categorized the individuals implicitly based on an irrelevant attribute. 
Interestingly, the results of Experiment 1 also suggested that this implicit categorization 
depended on explicit categorization based on the task-relevant attribute, such that the task-
irrelevant IAT effect could be reversed, or eliminated, when explicit categorization required to 
overcome implicit attitude toward the task-relevant attribute.  Experiment 2 addressed the 
question of whether the task-irrelevant IAT effect also depended on ‘implicit’ categorization of 
another task-irrelevant attribute.   
The IAT effect based on a task-irrelevant attribute could have been reversed for two 
possible reasons.  The first possibility is that it depends on one’s intention to overcome implicit 
attitude toward the task-relevant attribute.  When categorizing a Black male into the ‘pleasant’ 
category based on race, for example, categorization of the race (‘Black’ to ‘pleasant’) requires an 
explicit intention to overcome a racial bias.  Although the task-irrelevant gender IAT effect 
implies that implicit categorization of the gender (‘male’ to ‘pleasant’) did occur, it may not 
require an explicit intention to overcome a gender bias.  Therefore, if an intention to overcome a 
bias is required to eradicate or reverse the effects of another social bias, it is unlikely that the 
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IAT effect is modulated on trials that require incompatible response to a task-irrelevant attribute.  
However, if an intention is not required to reverse a task-irrelevant IAT effect, the IAT effect 
should depend also on whether a task-irrelevant attribute is responded compatibly or 
incompatibly.   
The second possibility is that the reversal of the IAT effect obtained in Experiment 1 
might have been because of the consistency of two implicit associations; that is, responses are 
faster when they are incompatible to both the task-relevant and -irrelevant attribute than when 
they are compatible with one attribute but incompatible with the other.  This could also explain 
the patterns of the results in Experiment 1.  If this is the case, the consistency of two task-
irrelevant implicit associations should also result in a reversed IAT effect.   
The present experiment extended the m-IAT in Experiment 1 and provided a test of these 
two possibilities.  The task included one task-relevant attribute and two task-irrelevant attributes.  
As a pilot study, we tested a variation of the m-IAT using the color (green/red, along with other 
color pairs such as purple/pink and blue/yellow) as the task-relevant attribute and found that 
categorization was consistently faster when green and red were categorized, respectively, into 
‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ than when green and red were categorized into ‘unpleasant’ and 
‘pleasant.’  There are several possible reasons for the advantage of the former assignment: for 
instance, green is often used as a ‘go’ signal whereas red is used as a ‘stop’ signal; green is often 
used to indicate ‘correct’ whereas red is used to indicate ‘incorrect’; or there is the possibility 
that the green we used in the pilot experiment was inadvertently brighter than the red.  
Regardless of the reason for the associations, it is sufficient for our present purposes that there 
are consistent biases in categorizing these particular colors into pleasant and unpleasant 
responses.   
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In the present experiment, stimulus images appeared within a colored frame that changed 
into green or red across trials.  Participants were all female because males provided less clear 
results in Experiment 1 with regard to the effect of gender (see also Aidman & Carroll, 2003; 
Meissner & Rothermund, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2003; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).  The task was 
essentially the same as Experiment 1; one phase required explicit categorization of images based 
on race, and the other phase required explicit categorization of the same images based on the 
color of the frames.  We assessed (1) whether more than one task-irrelevant attribute could 
influence categorization performance simultaneously (i.e., whether there could be task-irrelevant 
IAT effects based on multiple attributes), (2) whether explicit categorization affects more than 
one task-irrelevant attribute simultaneously, and (3) whether compatibility of a task-irrelevant 
attribute and categorization response influences the IAT effect based on another task-irrelevant 
attribute.  Note that green and red frames were used for all images with an equal probability; 
thus, there were no confounding effects of color compatibility and gender/race of individuals, 
which might have been present as in Experiment 1 (see the Discussion of Experiment 1).  The 
occurrence of a task-irrelevant IAT effect based on the frame color and its reversal in the 
compatible and incompatible blocks of the race task in the present experiment would indicate 
that the task-irrelevant IAT effect does depend on compatibility of a task-irrelevant attribute with 
the response category, not on unknown characteristics of the stimuli facilitating response speed 
for Black females and White males.  Finally, it is noteworthy that there is a possibility that task-
irrelevant IAT effects occurred in Experiment 1 because task-irrelevant attributes in one phase 
was used as the task-relevant attribute in the other phase.  Given that gender was never task-
relevant in the present experiment, such a possibility could be excluded if task-irrelevant gender 
IAT effect is to be replicated in the present experiment. 
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-five white females (mean age = 21.28, SD = 3.29, range = 18-31) were recruited 
from the Edge Hill University community.  They were either paid £3 or received experimental 
credits toward their psychology module for participation.  All participants reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color vision, and none had participated in 
Experiment 1.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 The experiment was similar to that of Experiment 1, but the stimulus display consisted of 
an image of a Black or White individual (as used in Experiment 1) with an additional color frame 
(green or red) surrounding the image. The photographs of individuals were the same as those in 
Experiment 1, and these photographs appeared in a green or red frame with an equal probability. 
The gender task was replaced with the color task, in which participants categorized the color 
frame into the ‘Green’ or ‘Red’ categories.  Thus, the gender was always task-irrelevant in both 
tasks.  The procedure followed that of Experiment 1 closely in other respects.   
Results 
 The data were filtered (0.34% of all trials) and analyzed in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1.  The overall error rate was 6.27%.  Mean RTs for correct responses and PEs were 
submitted to 2 (Race Compatibility) x 2 (Gender Compatibility) x 2 (Color Compatibility) 
ANOVAs separately for the race and color tasks.  Based on the pilot experiment and a 
preliminary inspection of the current data, color compatibility was coded as compatible for 
green-pleasant/red-unpleasant mappings and as incompatible for green-unpleasant/red-pleasant 
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mappings, which showed consistent compatibility relationships. RT and PE are summarized in 
Figure 2 and Table 4.  The results of ANOVA are summarized in Table 5. 
Race task   
RT indicated that for the race task, there was a significant race IAT effect, yielding a 60-
ms advantage for the White-pleasant/Black-unpleasant mapping (M = 637 ms) compared to the 
White-unpleasant/Black-pleasant mapping (M = 697 ms).  This effect represented the task-
relevant IAT effect.  Although there were no main effects of Gender Compatibility or Color 
Compatibility, these factors interacted with Race Compatibility, indicating the modulations of 
the race and color IAT effects according to the category assignment for race categorization.  The 
color IAT effect was 24 ms when the mapping between the race and inducer categories were 
compatible, but it reversed to –29 ms when the mapping was incompatible.  Similarly, the gender 
IAT effect was 39 ms when the mapping between the race and inducer categories were 
compatible, but it reversed to –25 ms.  These outcomes represented the modulations of task-
irrelevant IAT effects based on the compatibility of task-relevant category assignment, which 
was found in Experiment 1, and the findings of the color IAT effect indicate that these patterns 
do not reflect differential response speeds due to unknown stimulus properties as discussed in 
Experiment 1. Interestingly, although the effects of color and gender were obtained in the present 
experiment, there was no interaction between these two task-irrelevant attributes.  Thus, the task-
irrelevant IAT effects depended on categorization of the task-relevant attribute but not 
categorization of the task-irrelevant attribute.  PE showed no significant effect. 
Color task  
For RT, the only significant effect was a main effect of Color Compatibility.  RT was 98 
ms shorter for the green-pleasant/red-unpleasant mapping (M = 519 ms) than for the green-
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unpleasant/red-pleasant mapping (M = 617 ms).  The lack of the race and gender IAT effects in 
this task is interesting, as it suggests that there was no task-irrelevant IAT effects.   
 PE also showed a significant color IAT effect; responses were more accurate for the 
green-pleasant/red-unpleasant mapping (M = 4.70%) than for the green-unpleasant/red-pleasant 
mapping (M = 7.42%).  There was also a significant task-irrelevant gender IAT effect, but its 
direction was opposite to what would be expected; responses were more accurate for gender 
incompatible trials (M = 5.44%) than for gender compatible trials (M = 6.68%). No other effects 
were significant. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment demonstrated task-relevant IAT effects based on race and 
color.  In the race task, the task-irrelevant IAT effects were also obtained based on gender and 
color, and the occurrence of the task-irrelevant color IAT effect ruled out the possible 
confounding effect of an unknown stimulus property that might have slowed down responding to 
White males and Black females, which could have explained the task-irrelevant IAT effects of 
Experiment 1.  Thus, the present results reinforce the earlier conclusion that the IAT effect does 
occur based on task-irrelevant attributes.  The results also corroborated the finding in Experiment 
1 that the task-irrelevant IAT effects depended on explicit categorization of the task-relevant 
attribute, such that the task-irrelevant IAT effects were reversed when the task required 
participants to counter implicit attitude.  In addition, as gender was never task-relevant in the 
present experiment, the task-irrelevant gender IAT effect could not depend on participants’ prior 
experiences to perform the gender task.  Therefore, the present results confirm that more than 
one task-irrelevant attribute can influence categorization simultaneously, and the influences of 
task-irrelevant attributes depend on explicit categorization of the task-relevant attribute.   
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Furthermore, Experiment 2 also showed that the task-irrelevant IAT effects did not 
depend on the compatibility of the other task-irrelevant attribute; that is, categorizing individuals 
against the task-relevant attribute reversed the IAT effect based on a task-irrelevant attribute, but 
categorizing the same individuals against a task-irrelevant attribute did not reverse the IAT effect 
based on another task-irrelevant attribute.  This is a curious finding because the occurrence of the 
task-irrelevant IAT effect implies that participants categorized stimuli based on the task-
irrelevant attribute and would need to overcome a bias if the response is incompatible with the 
bias.  The results indicate that it is not the consistency of two implicit associations that are 
responsible for the results but agree with the claim that it is explicit categorization of the task-
relevant attribute, or the intention to overcome the bias toward the attribute, that modulates task-
irrelevant IAT effects.  
In addition to these main findings of interest, the present experiment provided another 
interesting outcome that in the case of the color task, the only significant effect was that of the 
task-relevant attribute (i.e., color IAT effect) in RT.  Neither of the two task-irrelevant attributes 
produced an IAT effect.  Although the task-irrelevant gender yielded a significant effect in PE, 
its direction was opposite to what would be expected from the results of Experiment 1.  The 
results suggest that the task-irrelevant IAT effect is somehow limited (also see De Houwer, 
2001).  There are several possible reasons for the lack of task-irrelevant IAT effects in the color 
task, and we considered three that we thought were equally plausible. 
The first possibility that we considered was that color categorization is so fast that 
participants had no time to process the race or gender of the individuals in the images. In fact, the 
time that it took to categorize color ranged from 500 ms to 650 ms on average, whereas the time 
that it took to categorize images based on race ranged from 600 ms to 750 ms.  This 100-ms 
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advantage of the color categorization might have eliminated the time for other attributes to 
influence responding (relative speed hypothesis).  The second possibility was that social biases 
(i.e., racial or gender biases) influence categorization performance only when categorization is 
performed on characteristics of individuals that are related closely to social preferences (e.g., 
Bluemke & Friese, 2006; Govan & Williams, 2004; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009).  
That is, the task-irrelevant IAT effect reflects conditional automaticity (see Bargh, 1989; 
Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018).  It may be that the task-irrelevant gender attribute influences 
categorization based on race because both attributes are relevant to individuals’ social 
characteristics, whereas the color of an image frame does not influence categorization of race or 
gender because it is not a social characteristic of the individuals (conditional automaticity 
hypothesis).  The third possibility was that the influence of task-irrelevant attributes is simply a 
matter of perceptual salience.  The more salient an attribute is, the more strongly the attribute 
influences categorization, regardless of its speed of processing or relatedness to the task-relevant 
attribute (relative salience hypothesis).  Experiment 3 tested the relative speed hypothesis, and 
Experiment 4 tested the conditional automaticity hypothesis and the relative salience hypothesis. 
Experiment 3 
To test the relative speed hypothesis in the present experiment, we introduced variable 
delays between onsets of the color frames and the photographs of individuals in the color task 
used in Experiment 2.  Each trial presented an image of an individual.  With a delay of 100, 250, 
or 500 ms, the color frame appeared around the image.  This delay provided a temporal 
advantage for the facial features of the individuals to be processed before the task-relevant color 
appeared.  The delayed presentation technique has been used in the Stroop task to investigate the 
time course of information processing (Glaser & Glaser, 1982), which showed that there were 
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larger facilitating effects of compatible task-irrelevant word meanings when the words occurred 
before the task-relevant color.  In the current task, if the relative speed hypothesis was correct, 
task-irrelevant social attributes (e.g., race and gender) would influence color categorization more 
profoundly and increases task-irrelevant IAT effects when the photographs were presented 
before the task-relevant color frames.  If speed of processing does not explain the lack of the 
task-irrelevant IAT effects in the color task, then the temporal advantage should have little 
impact on the task-irrelevant IAT effects. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four White females (mean age = 24.71, SD = 5.39, range = 18-37) were newly 
recruited from the same subject pool, with the same selection criteria. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 In the present experiment, the only diagnostic task was the color task.  After the first 
three blocks of practice trials as in the previous experiments, there were three blocks of 108 test 
trials each (36 trials for the inducer task and 72 trials for the color task).  For the color task, there 
were three types of trials with different color onset delays (CODs; i.e., the interval between the 
onset of the face and the onset of the color frame), which occurred randomly and equally often 
within each test block. The three CODs were 100, 250, and 500 ms.  
In the color task, a trial started with the fixation cross for 750 ms, followed by a face 
image used in Experiments 1-2.  With a variable COD, the color frame appeared around the 
image.  Participants had 3,000 ms to make a response after the onset of the color.  After the three 
test blocks, there were two practice blocks with the category labels for the color task being 
switched their locations, which were followed by another three test blocks.  These test blocks 
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were essentially the same as the first three test blocks, except for the locations of the category 
labels for the color task. 
Results 
The data were filtered in the same manner as in the preceding experiments (0.53% of all 
trials).  The overall error rate was 3.02%.  Mean RTs and PEs were submitted to a 3 (Color Onset 
Delay: 100 ms, 250 ms, and 500 ms) x 2 (Race Compatibility) x 2 (Gender Compatibility) x 2 
(Color Compatibility) ANOVA.  Color compatibility was coded as in Experiment 2.  RT and PE 
are shown in Figure 3 and in Table 6.  The ANOVA results are summarized in Table 7. 
 The ANOVA revealed only two significant effects: main effects of Color Onset Delay 
and of Color Compatibility.  All other effects were not significant.  RT was faster with the green-
pleasant/red-unpleasant assignment (M = 494 ms) than with the green-unpleasant/red-pleasant 
assignment (M = 589 ms).  RT increased as the color onset delay decreased (Ms = 514, 535, and 
575 ms, for 500-, 250-, and 100-ms delays, respectively).  These outcomes indicate that face 
images interfered with responding to the color as the color onset was closer to the onset of the 
face images.  Although this outcome implies that the faces interfered with processing color 
information at shorter delays, there was little evidence that the race or gender of the faces 
influenced responding to the color.  There was no significant effect in PE. 
Discussion 
The results of the present study were clearly inconsistent with the relative speed 
hypothesis that the influences of task-irrelevant social attributes (race and gender) on explicit 
categorization of color was due to fast processing of color information.  The present results 
indicated that the task-irrelevant IAT effects were absent even when there was sufficient time (> 
100 ms) to compensate the slow processing speed of social attributes.  It raises a question of 
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whether social attributes are actually processed in the color task for which only perceptual 
qualities are relevant to performing the task.  It is important to note that the present finding also 
indicates that the racial IAT effect is not purely perceptually based (e.g., skin colors), given that 
it does not emerge when the color was the task-relevant attribute. 
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4, we tested the two remaining hypotheses, the conditional automaticity 
hypothesis and the relative salience hypothesis.  Although the traditional conception of 
automaticity is that certain stimuli are processed unintentionally or even against the intention not 
to do so (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), such involuntary processes 
do not always occur unconditionally (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018).  Even in the Stroop and similar 
interference tasks that produce robust influences of task-irrelevant stimuli on performance, 
processing task-irrelevant stimulus attributes has been shown to depend on several contextual 
factors, such as the perceptual or categorical similarity with the task-relevant stimuli (Kahneman 
& Henik, 1981; Miles, Yamaguchi, & Proctor, 2009) and responses (Durgin, 2000).  More 
relevant to the current study, Spruyt et al. (2009) used an affective priming task in which 
participants were required to evaluate either the affective value (positive vs. negative) or a non-
affective value (human vs. object) of the target words in 75% of the trials.  They found the 
affective priming effect when participants evaluated the affective value, but not when they 
evaluated the non-affective value.  The results were replicated with masked primes (Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012), indicating that this conditional priming effect did not 
depend on whether participants were aware of the primes.  These studies suggest that automatic 
processing of irrelevant stimuli is conditional on the context or the requirement of the task (also 
see Yamaguchi & Proctor, 2011, 2012).  Such conditional automaticity may explain the lack of 
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task-irrelevant IAT effects in the color task of Experiments 2 and 3.  That is, task-irrelevant 
gender and racial attributes may not produce an IAT effect in the color task because participants 
are not prone to processing irrelevant social attributes of individuals when the task-relevant 
attribute is not socially relevant.  Alternatively, processing of task-irrelevant attributes may 
depend on perceptual salience.  Even if task-irrelevant attributes are processed, their influences 
may be a function of their relative salience, such that the task-irrelevant attributes exert stronger 
influences on responding when they are perceptually more salient.  The present experiment aims 
to disentangle these possibilities.  
The experiment was essentially the same as Experiment 2, in which participants 
performed the color task and the race task.  In the color task of the present experiment, however, 
the color frame was removed from the display; instead, the eyes of individuals in the images 
were colored in green or red, and participants categorized the photographs based on the eye 
colors.  The race task used the same photographs as those in the color task, but the eye colors 
were irrelevant.  Our assumption was that the eye color will be perceived as a personal 
characteristic of an individual, in a similar fashion to their race and gender, because eye color is 
often considered to be an important quality that determines one’s perceived attractiveness 
(Beattie & Shovelton, 2002; Grudl, Knoll, Eisenmann-Klein, & Prantl, 2012), group membership 
(Stewart, 2003), or even mate selection (Frost, 2006).  If so, the conditional automaticity 
hypothesis would predict that the task-irrelevant social attributes should also be processed and 
the task-irrelevant race and gender IAT effects should be reinstated in the color task.  In the race 
task, the task-irrelevant color and gender IAT effects should also be obtained, given that all of 
these attributes are socially relevant.  
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We also note that this assumption that eye color is perceived as a social attribute could be 
wrong.  Instead, eye color may still be processed as a perceptual attribute as in the preceding 
experiments, and perceptual salience of attributes may determine the IAT effect, as the relative 
salience hypothesis proposes.  The colors occupied small areas of the images as compared to the 
color frames in the previous two experiments, so the perceptual salience of color was made lower 
in the present experiment.  In the race task, the relative salience hypothesis provides an 
unambiguous prediction that the influence of color in the race task should be reduced, unlike in 
Experiment 2, because the relative salience of color was made lower.  Thus, the task-irrelevant 
color IAT effect may be eliminated in the race task.  In the color task, on the other hand, one 
might well reason that the salience of task-irrelevant social attributes would increase relative to 
that of colors, so the IAT effects should be obtained based on these social attributes.  Yet, one 
can also argue that participants would be forced to focus their attention on the small area of the 
photograph, which reduces attention to task-irrelevant social attributes and their influences.  
Therefore, the predictions of the relative salience hypothesis for the color task is ambiguous, and 
we remain neutral in this respect. 
Consequently, if the conditional automaticity hypothesis is correct, the task-irrelevant 
IAT effects should now occur based on social attributes (race and gender) in the color task as 
well as eye colors in the race task.  If the relative salience hypothesis is correct, the task-
irrelevant color IAT effect should now disappear in the race task, regardless of whether task-
irrelevant social attributes yield the IAT effect in the color task. 
Method 
Participants 
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 Twenty four White females (mean age = 21.79, SD = 6.12, range = 18-44) were newly 
recruited from the same subject pool, with the same selection criteria as before. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 The present experiment was essentially the same as Experiment 2, except for the way 
colors were presented.  Unlike Experiment 2 in which the color of the picture frame was varied 
across trials, the present experiment removed the picture frame (as in Experiment 1) and varied 
the colors of the eyes on the faces.  The face stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 
2, but the pupil was colored in red or green (the stimuli can be found in the OSF project page as 
noted in the author notes).  We decided to use red and green to match with the colors used in 
Experiments 2 and 3, although they were not common colors in human eyes.  In the color task, 
participants selected a response based on the pupil color, but they ignored the color in the race 
task.  The procedure followed that of Experiment 2 in other respects. 
Results 
The data were filtered (0.93% of all trials) and analyzed in the same manner as in the 
preceding experiments.  The overall error rate was 5.86%.  Mean RTs were submitted to 2 (Race 
Compatibility) x 2 (Gender Compatibility) x 2 (Color Compatibility) ANOVAs separately for the 
race and color tasks.  Color compatibility was coded as in Experiments 2 and 3.  RT and PE are 
shown in Figure 4 and in Table 8.  The results of ANOVA are summarized in Table 9. 
Race task  
For RT, there was a main effect of Race Compatibility, which showed an 80-ms 
advantage for the White-good/Black-bad mapping (M = 659 ms) than for the White-bad/Black-
good mapping (M = 739 ms).  There was also an interaction between Race Compatibility and 
Gender Compatibility.  There was a gender IAT effect of 27 ms (Ms = 646 ms vs. 673 ms for 
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gender compatible and incompatible trials, respectively) when the race was compatible; there 
was a reversed gender IAT effect of –38 ms (Ms = 758 ms vs. 720 ms for gender compatible and 
incompatible trials, respectively) when the race was incompatible.  These outcomes were 
consistent with Experiment 1.  But, unlike Experiment 1, the present experiment produced no 
influence of Color Compatibility. The results are consistent with the relative salience hypothesis 
but are inconsistent with the conditional automaticity hypothesis.  PE did not show any 
significant effect. 
Color task  
For RT, the only significant effect was a main effect of Color Compatibility.  Responses 
were faster for the green-good/red-bad mapping (M = 621 ms) than for the green-bad/red-good 
mapping (M = 720 ms).  There was no influences of the gender or race when they were irrelevant 
to the task.  The results are also inconsistent with the conditional automaticity hypothesis, 
whereas they neither support nor contradict the relative salience hypothesis. 
 For PE, Color Compatibility also showed a marginal effect; responses were more 
accurate for the green-good/red-bad mapping (M = 3.55%) than for the green-bad/red-good 
mapping (M = 5.73%).  No other effects reached significance. 
Discussion 
The present results provided little support for the conditional automaticity hypothesis. 
Instead, the outcomes of the race task were consistent with the relative salience hypothesis.  As 
the colors occupied smaller areas of the images, the colors were no longer salient enough to exert 
an influence when they were task-irrelevant in the race task.  These results point to the role of 
attention in producing the task-irrelevant IAT effects, which also raises a question about the 
implicitness of the task-irrelevant attributes that produce the IAT effect.  Note that the present 
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results corroborate the conclusion in Experiment 3 that the racial IAT effect is not due to a 
perceptual quality of individuals (e.g., skin color), given that the race IAT only produced the 
gender effect but not the color effect, whereas the color IAT only produced the color effect but 
not the race effect.  These findings have important implications as to the origin of racial IAT 
effects. 
General Discussion 
In the IAT, participants are asked to categorize material based upon particular attributes 
of interest.  For example, to measure implicit attitudes toward race, participants are required to 
categorize individuals according to their race.  It is unclear as to how such task requirements may 
impact upon participants’ perception of the material in question, and this raises an important 
question as to whether implicit attitudes toward attributes of an individual in the target stimulus 
influence participants’ judgement when these attributes are actually irrelevant to performing the 
task.  To address this issue, we used the m-IAT that involved multiple social or non-social 
attributes, some of which were relevant and some of which were irrelevant to the task in hand.  
By using this paradigm, the present study asked the following questions: firstly whether social 
biases that are measured in the standard IAT are still observed when the attribute in question 
(e.g. race or gender) is irrelevant to the performance of the task, and secondly how one’s 
intention to categorize any attribute influences the categorization of other attributes.  In the 
following sections, we first summarize the findings from the four experiments and consider their 
theoretical implications.  We then consider the societal significance of our results. 
Theoretical Implications and Remaining Empirical Issues 
Experiment 1 showed that both race and gender biases do influence people’s 
categorization performance even when these attributes are irrelevant to the task in hand.  
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Nevertheless, the effects of task-irrelevant attributes were smaller than the effect of the task-
relevant attribute, and the direction of the task-irrelevant IAT effect depended on whether the 
task requires participants to counter against the bias based on the task-relevant attribute.  Thus, 
the task-irrelevant IAT effect was reversed when categories were assigned to responses 
incompatible with participants’ biases.  These results corroborate the classic finding of Hedge 
and Marsh (1975) in the Simon task, where the Simon effect is reversed when participants are 
required to select response colors that are incompatible with stimulus colors.  Experiment 2 
showed that more than one task-irrelevant attribute could influence categorization performance 
at the same time, and that countering a bias based on a task-irrelevant attribute has no influence 
on the task-irrelevant IAT effect based on another task-irrelevant attribute.  The results excluded 
the possibility that the IAT effect reversed when two implicit associations were inconsistent.  
Instead, overcoming one implicit bias reverses the effects of implicit biases in other domains, but 
the reversal requires an intention to overcome bias, as overcoming a bias on a task-irrelevant 
attribute does not alter the influence of other task-irrelevant attributes.  Therefore, the results 
highlight the importance of the intention to overcome social biases in modulating the influences 
of implicit attitudes. 
Experiments 3 and 4 followed up these intriguing findings of Experiment 2 and showed 
that performing a categorization based on color did not produce any influence of task-irrelevant 
attributes of race and gender, whereas performing the categorization of race did produce an 
influence of the task-irrelevant color attribute.  These asymmetric results are suggestive of how 
explicit categorization determines the influences of task-irrelevant attributes.  We considered 
three possible hypotheses which may help us understand the processes underpinning this: the 
relative speed hypothesis, the conditional automaticity hypothesis, and the relative salience 
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hypothesis.  Experiment 3 tested the relative speed hypothesis by varying the interval between 
the onset of target colors and facial images.  Although the relative speed hypothesis predicted 
that the task-irrelevant IAT effects based on race and gender would be obtained when the facial 
images were presented before the target color, the results did not support this.  Experiment 4 
tested the conditional automaticity hypothesis and the relative salience hypothesis.  The 
conditional automaticity hypothesis predicted that the task-irrelevant IAT effects based on 
gender and race would be obtained if the colors were presented as part of the individuals’ 
personal characteristics.  The relative salience hypothesis predicted that the task-irrelevant IAT 
effects depend on the availability of attention to perceptually salient attributes, and that task-
irrelevant IAT effect based on color should disappear when the colors were made less salient.  
Our results were consistent with the relative salience hypothesis.   
The results supporting the relative speed hypothesis also corroborate the reversal of the 
Simon effect found in Hedge and Marsh’s (1975) task, in which the irrelevant stimulus attribute 
(spatial position) is much different from the target attribute (color).  Studies have shown that 
encoding of spatial positions are obligatory (e.g., Logan, 1998), even though the target attribute 
is non-spatial.  Hence, the irrelevant stimulus attribute is salient in Hedge and Marsh’s task, as 
the colors were in the present experiment; other social attributes of individuals might not have 
been sufficiently salient as compared to colors.  Nevertheless, we also note the possibility that 
our assumption of eye colors being processed as a social cue may be incorrect in the first place 
(especially, given that we used red and green as eye colors, instead of more natural eye colors, in 
order to match the color of the stimuli used in the preceding experiments).  We must 
acknowledge that our results do not refute the conditional automaticity hypothesis entirely and 
that a stronger test of the conditional automaticity hypothesis will be required in future 
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investigations.  Indeed, we would suggest that the relative salience hypothesis and the 
conditional automaticity hypotheses are not, in fact, mutually exclusive, and they might both be 
correct at the same time.   
In summary, the present set of experiments imply that the influence of task-irrelevant 
attributes is contingent on categorization of the task-relevant attribute and that biases measured 
in the IAT may not be implicit to participants who are performing the task.  Also, a corollary to 
these findings is that the racial IAT effect is not a perceptually-based effect (such as the 
perceptual quality of individuals’ skin colors) because the race effect and color effect do not 
coincide in the current variants of the IAT; if both effects depended on perceptual properties, 
they should co-occur.   
Societal Significance and Implications 
The findings of the present studies shed new light on the cognitive processes underlying 
the manifestation of social biases, and they may have far-reaching implications regarding the 
very nature of social biases and their possible effects on social judgements, as well as their 
relevance for social equality and social justice.  We consider five possible implications. 
Firstly, our studies have shown that social biases can affect people’s judgment of others 
not only on the basis of the exact characteristics that are under consideration at any given time, 
but also on the basis of characteristics that are irrelevant to the matter at hand.  Thus, these 
experiments confirm that social biases can affect judgments when they are not relevant to the 
judgment being made.  This has not been previously been demonstrated in research using the 
IAT, although our conclusion is, in fact, corroborated by the findings in other tasks, such as the 
pronunciation task, in which participants are not required to evaluate any stimuli but produce in-
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group advantage in reading affective words (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996).  We should also note that 
the influence of irrelevant attributes depends on whether these attributes are sufficiently salient.  
Secondly, we found, in line with all previous IAT studies, that it is possible to counter 
one’s own social bias by intention (otherwise, correct responses would rarely occur in the 
incompatible blocks of the IAT). Our results also demonstrated that such intention to overcome a 
bias can influence the effects of other biases that one might have about other social 
characteristics of the target individuals.  For instance, we found that the intention to counter a 
racial bias can eliminate or even reverse the IAT effect based on a gender bias.  It does require a 
little caution to interpret this reversal as necessarily reflecting the actual reversal of the 
underlying bias itself, because our results only showed a reversal of the ‘effect’ of a social bias 
and there could be reasons other than a reversal of the bias itself that result in a reversed effect.  
An alternative explanation would be that the reversal reflected the congruence between two 
biases on a given trial.  Responses might be faster when two biases are both compatible or 
incompatible at the same time than when one is compatible and the other is incompatible.  
Nevertheless, this account does not seem to fit the finding in Experiment 2 that two task-
irrelevant biases did not reverse the IAT effects, indicating that mere congruence between social 
biases does not explain the results obtained.  Further studies are clearly required to elucidate the 
mechanisms of this reversal. 
Thirdly, the lack of an influence of a task-irrelevant bias on another task-irrelevant bias 
implies that responding against a task-irrelevant bias does not modulate the influence of another 
social bias.  This finding is important.  For example, when an intervention program is designed 
to eliminate one type of social bias, the elimination, or reversal, of this bias may not transfer 
automatically to eradicate another type of social bias, unless the trainee continues to suppress 
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their own bias intentionally.  As previous studies of transfer of learning has shown (e.g., Proctor, 
Yamaguchi, Zang, & Vu, 2009; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 2009; Yamaguchi et al., 2015), the 
effectiveness of bias modification training would be limited to the very attribute that trainees are 
being trained for.  The extent to which the effect of training transfers to untrained social biases 
would be an interesting topic to explore in future investigations. 
Fourthly, our study also suggests that paradigms that are meant to measure implicit biases 
may only be applicable to the dimensions that are related closely to the type of judgments 
required in the paradigms used.  That is, the IAT may be used to measure an irrelevant racial bias 
when the task requires subjects to categorize individuals based on another social attribute of 
individuals, but it may not work when it requires subjects to categorize individuals based on a 
non-social attribute, such as the dresses that the individuals are wearing (e.g., in terms of style or 
appropriateness; Spruyt et al., 2009).  There have been a number of significant and vigorous 
debates as to the validity of the race IAT in predicting discrimination behaviors (e.g., Carlsson & 
Ageström, 2016; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; 
Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013), and the results do look somewhat mixed.  
The present series of studies provide new evidence about some important aspects of when and 
how task-irrelevant IAT results emerge, which not only helps us understand discrepancies in the 
literature but also provides a new theoretical platform for future research in this area.  A 
corollary to the present finding is that race is processed differently from color, implying that the 
racial effect is not based on a perceptual quality of individuals; that is, it is not the skin color 
itself that is producing the racial IAT effect, but it is what the skin color represents  – it is the 
race of a given individual that is the origin of the racial IAT effect.  Hence, the dissociation 
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between the racial and color IAT effects in the present study provides an important contribution 
to the debate as to the origins of the IAT effect. 
Finally, we should note that, as shown in previous studies (e.g., Aidman & Carroll, 2003; 
Meissner & Rothermund, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2003; Nosek & Banaji, 2003), the gender IAT 
effect appears more unambiguous for female participants than for male participants (Experiment 
1).  Given that the main purpose of the present research required more than two attributes to 
produce the IAT effect, we decided to focus on female participants in the subsequent 
experiments.  This may, however, limit the generalizability of the present set of results.  We also 
note here that all four experiments took place in a university campus as do most psychological 
studies.  Although we do not have strong reasons to doubt the generalizability of the findings 
beyond our participant population, this remains an empirical issue of potentially enormous 
societal importance that awaits scrutiny in different locations and with different populations. 
Concluding Remarks 
We have demonstrated that implicit biases (related to both race and gender) do still 
emerge when the attribute is irrelevant to the task in hand, but the biases which emerge are 
smaller in magnitude.  Our results also indicated that the manifestations of such implicit biases 
depend on explicit categorization of the task-relevant attribute categories that participants must 
be aware of in order to complete the task accurately.  We have attempted to uncover the 
processes operating in the IAT and forge connections with theoretical ideas from mainstream 
cognitive psychology, including research on the Simon effect and the Stroop effect, to cast new 
light on these processes.  We suggest that this set of studies will necessitate a rethink of how we 
define implicit processes in the IAT and should lead to a more critical and focussed perspective 
on race and gender bias research going forward.   
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Context 
 Given the current climate in globalized communities in North America, Europe, and 
elsewhere, it is crucial that individuals are treated in a fair manner, regardless of their origin, 
race, gender, and other salient characteristics that are often irrelevant to selection processes for 
occupations or education.  However, it has been very difficult to determine how potential biases 
based on irrelevant personal characteristics could be measured.  Although the implicit 
association test (IAT) has been very popular, there has been considerable debate as to the origin 
of the effects measured in the test.  The present article provides an experimental study that 
investigated cognitive bases of the IAT effect and revealed that the explicit categorization 
required in the task plays a significant role in determining the effect size.  The results also 
indicate that the occurrence of the IAT effect depends on the kinds of category used in the task.  
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Table 1. Mean ratings of five attributes of the face stimuli used in Experiment 1 (values in the 
parentheses are standard deviations). 
 Black Female Black Male White Female White Male 
Attractiveness 3.00 (0.53) 3.00 (0.41) 3.01 (0.46) 3.00 (0.43) 
Typicality 3.11 (0.33) 3.04 (0.31) 3.15 (0.31) 3.10 (0.30) 
Strength of Emotion 3.54 (0.58) 3.41 (0.83) 3.39 (0.44) 3.41 (0.76) 
Friendliness 3.92 (0.46) 3.77 (0.66) 3.80 (0.39) 3.85 (0.46) 
Memorability 3.11 (0.37) 3.17 (0.41) 3.00 (0.34) 3.16 (0.39) 
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Table 2. Percentage Errors in Experiment 1. 
Participants Task Gender Compatibility 
  Race Compatibility 
  Compatible Incompatible 
Female Race Compatible   4.53 (.78) 4.28 (.86) 
  
Incompatible 
 
5.05 (.79) 4.61 (.92) 
 
Gender Compatible 
 
5.55 (.79) 6.80 (1.08) 
    Incompatible   10.01 (1.35) 7.38 (1.14) 
Male Race Compatible   1.99 (.45) 3.87 (.82) 
  
Incompatible 
 
3.66 (.62) 3.34 (.79) 
 
Gender Compatible 
 
4.17 (.76) 6.63 (1.00) 
    Incompatible   3.35 (.60) 4.65 (.79) 
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Table 3. Results of the Analyses of Variance on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) 
in Experiment 1. 
Factor df MSE F p ηp2 
 Females: RT 
Task 1,31 7969.23 2.30 .139 .069 
Gender Compatibility (GC) 1,31 3549.14 42.23 < .001 .577 
Race Compatibility (RC) 1,31 5434.76 11.41 .002 .269 
Task x GC 1,31 2749.97 17.21 < .001 .357 
Task x RC 1,31 6038.42 6.28 .018 .168 
GC x RC 1,31 2315.94 28.21 < .001 .476 
Task x GC x RC 1,31 1702.73 < 1 .742 .004 
 Females: PE 
Task 1,31 22.18 22.91 < .001 .425 
GC 1,31 25.51 5.45 .026 .149 
RC 1,31 26.75 < 1 .430 .020 
Task x GC 1,31 18.05 3.92 .057 .112 
Task x RC 1,31 19.46 < 1 .752 .003 
GC x RC 1,31 23.87 2.76 .107 .082 
Task x GC x RC 1,31 17.25 3.17 .085 .093 
 Males: RT 
Task 1,31 12849.57 < 1 .456 .018 
GC 1,31 5445.73 4.05 .053 .116 
RC 1,31 5174.69 40.52 < .001 .567 
Task x GC 1,31 6696.03 4.00 .054 .114 
Task x RC 1,31 5457.95 21.96 < .001 .415 
GC x RC 1,31 2206.35 < 1 .461 .018 
Task x GC x RC 1,31 2412.78 2.52 .123 .075 
 Males: PE 
Task 1,31 13.50 10.44 .003 .252 
GC 1,31 19.84 < 1 .460 .018 
RC 1,31 15.99 7.09 .012 .186 
Task x GC 1,31 10.53 5.86 .022 .159 
Task x RC 1,31 13.76 1.41 .245 .043 
GC x RC 1,31 8.51 5.31 .028 .146 
Task x GC x RC 1,31 7.75 < 1 .459 .018 
Note: Bold indicates significant effects at alpha = .05. 
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Table 4. Percentage Errors in Experiment 2. 
Task Color Compatibility 
Gender 
Compatibility 
  Race Compatibility 
  Compatible Incompatible 
Race Compatible Compatible   5.00 (1.40) 7.03 (1.21) 
  
Incompatible 
 
2.75 (.89) 8.25 (1.93) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
8.25 (1.60) 8.53 (2.01) 
    Incompatible   7.33 (1.45) 6.57 (1.79) 
Color Compatible Compatible   4.25 (.86) 5.78 (.96) 
  
Incompatible 
 
2.88 (.67) 5.88 (1.27) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
8.78 (1.29) 7.92 (1.39) 
    Incompatible   6.56 (1.23) 6.42 (1.14) 
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Table 5. Results of the Analyses of Variance on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) 
in Experiment 2. 
Factor df MSE F p ηp2 
 Race Task: RT 
Color Compatibility (CC) 1, 24 1693.84 < 1 .684 .007 
Gender Compatibility (GC) 1, 24 2486.43 1.07 .311 .043 
Race Compatibility (RC) 1, 24 15918.67 11.49 .002 .324 
CC x GC 1, 24 3571.58 < 1 .425 .027 
CC x RC 1, 24 5587.92 6.46 .018 .212 
GC x RC 1, 24 3287.34 15.67 .001 .395 
CCx GC x RC 1, 24 3996.00 < 1 .802 .003 
 Race Task: PE 
CC 1, 24 56.18 3.26 .084 .119 
GC 1, 24 34.13 1.41 .248 .055 
RC 1, 24 70.89 2.19 .152 .084 
CC x GC 1, 24 42.08 < 1 .619 .010 
CC x RC 1, 24 52.18 3.85 .061 .138 
GC x RC 1, 24 49.58 < 1 .550 .015 
CCx GC x RC 1, 24 25.11 2.54 .124 .096 
 Color Task: RT 
CC 1, 24 16896.48 28.20 < .001 .540 
GC 1, 24 3420.56 1.91 .180 .074 
RC 1, 24 2552.82 < 1 .393 .031 
CC x GC 1, 24 3855.17 < 1 .670 .008 
CC x RC 1, 24 5359.09 1.62 .215 .063 
GC x RC 1, 24 2699.71 < 1 .698 .006 
CCx GC x RC 1, 24 2734.75 < 1 .499 .019 
 Color Task: PE 
CC 1, 24 29.49 12.57 .002 .344 
GC 1, 24 11.68 6.68 .016 .218 
RC 1, 24 16.78 2.31 .142 .088 
CC x GC 1, 24 32.01 < 1 .452 .024 
CC x RC 1, 24 28.55 3.33 .081 .122 
GC x RC 1, 24 20.07 < 1 .398 .030 
CCx GC x RC 1, 24 19.96 < 1 .768 .004 
Note: Bold indicates significant effects at alpha = .05. 
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Table 6. Percentage Errors in Experiment 3 (COD = Color Onset Delay in millisecond). 
COD Color Compatibility Gender Compatibility 
  Race Compatibility 
  Compatible Incompatible 
100 Compatible Compatible   2.43 (.81) 2.56 (.95) 
  
Incompatible 
 
3.13 (.93) 3.26 (1.06) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
4.38 (1.05) 4.08 (.94) 
    Incompatible   4.54 (1.02) 3.14 (.84) 
250 Compatible Compatible   1.52 (.72) 2.21 (.77) 
  
Incompatible 
 
1.82 (.52) 2.47 (.81) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
4.20 (.91) 4.36 (.96) 
    Incompatible   2.30 (.57) 2.97 (.89) 
500 Compatible Compatible   1.62 (.64) 1.79 (.72) 
  
Incompatible 
 
2.35 (.81) 2.45 (.73) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
4.19 (1.00) 3.01 (1.06) 
    Incompatible   4.37 (1.00) 3.32 (.87) 
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Table 7. Results of the Analyses of Variance on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) 
in Experiment 3. 
Factor df MSE F p ηp2 
 RT 
Color Onset Delay (COD) 2,46 2334.09 78.57 < .001 .774 
Color Compatibility (CC) 1,23 46369.50 27.93 < .001 .548 
Gender Compatibility (GC) 1,23 2705.14 < 1 .797 .003 
Race Compatibility (RC) 1,23 2505.76 < 1 .425 .028 
COD x CC 2,46 1893.50 < 1 .392 .040 
COD x GC 2,46 2020.94 < 1 .560 .025 
CC x GC 1,23 1995.00 < 1 .915 .001 
COD x CC x GC 2,46 1458.01 1.20 .311 .050 
COD x RC 1,23 1589.01 < 1 .998 < .001 
CC x RC 1,23 2015.40 < 1 .717 .006 
COD x CC x RC 2,46 1633.71 1.65 .203 .067 
GC x RC 1,23 2853.58 < 1 .565 .015 
COD x GC x RC 2,46 1823.87 < 1 .407 .038 
CC x GC x RC 1,23 1132.96 2.07 .164 .083 
COD x CC x GC x RC 2,46 2042.15 1.23 .302 .051 
 PE 
COD 2,46 11.93 2.23 .120 .088 
CC 1,23 94.08 3.17 .088 .121 
GC 1,23 7.06 < 1 .926 < .001 
RC 1,23 11.65 < 1 .726 .005 
COD x CC 2,46 15.25 < 1 .834 .008 
COD x GC 2,46 12.38 1.37 .265 .056 
CC x GC 1,23 14.72 3.22 .086 .123 
COD x CC x GC 2,46 11.65 < 1 .574 .024 
COD x RC 1,23 12.68 1.20 .310 .050 
CC x RC 1,23 10.95 2.26 .146 .090 
COD x CC x RC 2,46 16.19 < 1 .822 .009 
GC x RC 1,23 14.75 < 1 .880 .001 
COD x GC x RC 2,46 11.65 < 1 .844 .007 
CC x GC x RC 1,23 9.71 < 1 .909 .001 
COD x CC x GC x RC 2,46 14.17 < 1 .853 .007 
Note: Bold indicates significant effects at alpha = .05. 
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Table 8. Percentage Errors in Experiment 4. 
Task Color Compatibility Gender Compatibility 
  Race Compatibility 
  Compatible Incompatible 
Race Compatible Compatible   7.17 (2.17) 6.88 (1.58) 
  
Incompatible 
 
9.11 (2.84) 7.14 (1.48) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
7.86 (3.18) 6.04 (1.33) 
    Incompatible   8.37 (2.63) 4.26 (1.14) 
Color Compatible Compatible   2.60 (.83) 3.98 (1.21) 
  
Incompatible 
 
3.40 (1.13) 4.22 (1.11) 
 
Incompatible Compatible 
 
6.01 (1.48) 5.52 (1.22) 
    Incompatible   5.82 (1.47) 5.58 (1.54) 
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Table 9. Results of the Analyses of Variance on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) 
in Experiment 4. 
Factor df MSE F p ηp2 
 Race Task: RT 
Color Compatibility (CC) 1,23 2536.41 < 1 .562 .015 
Gender Compatibility (GC) 1,23 4336.89 < 1 .566 .015 
Race Compatibility (RC) 1,23 36696.87 8.35 .008 .266 
CC x GC 1,23 6020.51 < 1 .832 .002 
CC x RC 1,23 4504.26 .11 .744 .005 
GC x RC 1,23 7474.73 6.65 .017 .224 
CCx GC x RC 1,23 3879.34 1.20 .284 .050 
 Race Task: PE 
CC 1,23 51.49 < 1 .373 .035 
GC 1,23 17.69 < 1 .707 .006 
RC 1,23 310.38 < 1 .428 .028 
CC x GC 1,23 15.03 2.42 .133 .095 
CC x RC 1,23 46.48 < 1 .362 .036 
GC x RC 1,23 28.56 1.66 .211 .067 
CCx GC x RC 1,23 53.81 < 1 .888 .001 
 Color Task:RT 
CC 1,23 31590.90 14.75 .001 .391 
GC 1,23 6394.90 < 1 .935 < .001 
RC 1,23 3157.07 1.39 .250 .057 
CC x GC 1,23 4864.39 < 1 .332 .041 
CC x RC 1,23 3039.99 < 1 .646 .009 
GC x RC 1,23 6453.81 1.16 .293 .048 
CCx GC x RC 1,23 5150.06 < 1 .612 .011 
 Color Task:PE 
CC 1,23 55.28 4.13 .054 .152 
GC 1,23 25.06 < 1 .754 .004 
RC 1,23 39.97 < 1 .693 .007 
CC x GC 1,23 24.84 < 1 .687 .007 
CC x RC 1,23 44.58 < 1 .457 .024 
GC x RC 1,23 27.57 < 1 .919 < .001 
CCx GC x RC 1,23 36.14 < 1 .821 .002 
Note: Bold indicates significant effects at alpha = .05. 
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Figure 1.  Mean response times for female (A and B) and male (C and D) participants in the 
Gender and Race IAT tasks; error bars are standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 2.  Mean response times in the Race IAT task (A) and the Color IAT task (B); error bars 
are standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 3.  Mean response times in the Color IAT task as a function of SOA and Race 
Compatibility (A and B) or Gender Compatibility (C and D) for color compatible and 
incompatible trials, and as a function of SOA and Color Compatibility (E); error bars are 
standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 4.  Mean response times in the Race IAT task (A) and the Color IAT task (B); error bars 
are standard errors of the means. 
 
 
